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Dealing with trade-offs lies at the heart of environmental impact assessment (EIA).  However, 
there has been scant reflection to date on the concept of trade-offs within the EIA literature.  
This paper aims to contribute to the thinking about trade-offs by distilling key learning points 
from research conducted within the field of psychology.  In particular the paper explores three 
interrelated questions namely: ‘When are trade-off decisions difficult?’; ‘How do we react when 
faced with difficult trade-off decisions?’ and ‘How can we deal with difficult trade-off decisions?’  
The research confirms that EIA functions within a very difficult trade-off decision-making context 
and that observed behavior related to these difficult decisions can be explained from a 
psychology perspective.  In order to deal better with trade-off decisions it is helpful to be able to 
predict decision difficulty and anticipate resultant behavior.  Moreover, the way we present and 
frame decisions affect their outcomes.   
 
 







Dealing with trade-offs in decision-making is one of the more important and at the same time 
lesser explored concepts in environmental impact assessment (EIA)1.  Our literature review 
suggests that the discussion of trade-offs in impact assessment was first introduced in the late 
1990s, with explicit discussion found in Sadler (1996), Glasson (1999), Weston (2000) and 
Wood (2003).  More recent contributions have been made by authors engaged with 
sustainability assessment, including Gibson et al (2005), Gibson (2006) and Morrison-Saunders 
and Pope (2013), since the concept of sustainability brings into focus the difficult trade-offs 
faced by EIA decision-makers between competing objectives.  From an EIA perspective, dealing 
with, and thinking about trade-offs, warrants a sound understanding of how decision-making 
works.  Therefore we explore the broader psychology literature which has a long history of 
general decision-making research but also research specifically dealing with trade-offs.  In our 
literature search we came across a publication entitled ‘Conflict and Trade-offs in Decision-
making’ edited by Weber et al (2011).  On our first reading of the book three questions emerged 
that are being addressed in psychology and which are particularly relevant to dealing with trade-
offs in EIA, namely: 
 
• When are trade-off decisions difficult?  This question is particularly considered in the 
published work on prediction of trade-off decision difficulty.  This could typically be the 
first point of reflection for impact assessment practitioners, which allows them to 
anticipate difficulty in dealing with particular trade-off decisions. 
• How do we react when faced with difficult trade-off decisions?  This question is 
considered in research on behavior prediction which aims to understand decision-maker 
behavior related to difficult trade-off decisions. 
• How can we deal with difficult trade-off decisions?  The psychology research also 
provides pointers and solutions on how to deal with difficult trade-off decisions.  Although 
there is not a single magic silver bullet we intend to introduce new thinking towards 
finding solutions to dealing with trade-offs that we believe will be useful to impact 
assessment practitioners. 
 
                                                          
1 We use the term EIA in a generic sense as an umbrella term encapsulating any form of 'impact 
assessment' and/or 'environmental assessment' 
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We further conceptualized these three questions by highlighting the relation between them as 
illustrated in Figure 1.  Using the questions as the basis for a conceptual framework we explored 
the psychology literature in more depth by following the literature trail initially provided by Weber 
et al (2011), with a view to distill key learning from psychology to inform thinking about and 
dealing with trade-off decision-making in EIA – which is the main aim of this paper.  
 
Figure 1:  Key research questions within psychology related to trade-off decision-making  
 
At the outset, our search for answers to the three questions reveals that the consideration and 
management of trade-offs in decision-making is a key issue not just for EIA but for the broader 
area of decision-making, which in turn is a subject of intense interest and research in many 
disciplines. As Kahneman and Tversky (1984, p341) observe: 
 
Making decisions is like speaking prose—people do it all the time, knowingly or 
unknowingly. It is hardly surprising, then, that the topic of decision-making is shared by 
many disciplines, from mathematics and statistics, through economics and political 
science, to sociology and psychology. 
 
These various bodies of research and practice offer rich insights into the nature of decision-
making and trade-offs, and can potentially be mined for the benefit of EIA researchers and 
practitioners. The potential for cross-pollination of this kind is already recognised within the EIA 
community, which has often drawn upon the related fields of planning, policy analysis and 
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political science in the interests of theory-building (e.g. Bartlett and Kurian 1999, Lawrence 
2000, Nitz and Brown 2001). The links between EIA and these other fields are strong and can 
be traced back to the earliest days of impact assessment, since Lynton Caldwell - widely 
considered as the father of impact assessment and the person who in the late 1960s introduced 
EIA in the United States - was a political scientist.  
 
These fields themselves are by nature multidisciplinary: for example, the very early contributors 
to the study of public policy and administration drew upon psychology to highlight the 
implications of cognitive limitations for decision-making. Resultant concepts such as ‘satisficing’ 
(Simon 1956), ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1957) and ‘successive limited comparisons’ 
(Lindblom 1959) have subsequently been introduced to the field of impact assessment by a 
number of contributors, including Kørnøv and Thissen (2000) and Nilsson and Dalkmann 
(2001), particularly in the context of strategic environmental assessment (SEA) and an 
exploration of the influence of SEA on planning and decision-making processes. 
 
This paper follows the tradition of exploring beyond the established boundaries of EIA for 
insights, but has a specific focus in terms of the field upon which we draw, which in turn has 
implications for the aspects of impact assessment with which we are concerned.  Research on 
trade-off decision-making has been a particular focus of the psychology research tradition for a 
long time (e.g. Lewin, 1951; Edwards, 1954; Atkinson, 1964; Baron, 1986; Schwartz, 1986).  
However, Baron and Weber (2011) distinguish between research approaches firmly within the 
psychology tradition (for example Lewin, 1951) and research based on the infusion of economic 
thinking and psychology (for example Edwards, 1954).  These two approaches have developed 
as parallel fields since the 1950s, with the first characterised by more qualitative methodologies 
(in the psychology tradition), while the second ventured into more quantitative and practice 
based research, making the link between theory and real world decision-making. The practical 
nature of the latter approach makes it particularly relevant to EIA. We found the work which 
evolved at the juncture of economics and cognitive psychology and which aims to “explain and 
predict decision-making behavior, whether such behavior appears to be rational or irrational” 
(Baron and Weber 2011, p5), to be particularly relevant to our consideration of trade-offs in 
decision-making. 
 
The relationship between economic theory and psychology in the context of decision-making 
was first explored by Ward Edwards (1954). Simply put, whereas classic economic theory 
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argues that action maximizes utility, psychology argues that the decision maker decides 
between options and chooses the option which is better than the status quo (Edwards and 
Tversky 1967). Simon (1959) highlights the different assumptions about the decision-making 
context that underpin these two models: whereas the ‘economic man’ is perceived to have 
unlimited cognitive ability and to operate in a stable environment in which goals are clearly 
defined and perfect information is available, and hence the decision-maker's personal attributes 
are irrelevant, the alternative view acknowledges that in reality decision-making contexts are 
complex and unstable and that different individuals will perceive and interpret this environment 
differently, as well as having different information-processing abilities. Hence from a 
psychological perspective it is important to understand both the perceptual and the cognitive 
characteristics of the decision-maker. Simon (1985) later distinguishes between ‘substantive’ or 
‘objective’ rationality focused on outcomes, which is the domain of economics, with ‘procedural’ 
or ‘bounded’ rationality focused on the processes by which an individual makes decisions, which 
is the domain of cognitive psychology.  
 
The psychology research is typically concerned with decisions being made by a single individual 
according to their own interests. Although we recognise that EIA is a process comprised of 
innumerable inter-related decisions (Weston 2000), many of which are not discreet and are 
made collectively and iteratively through processes including negotiation, bargaining or learning 
(Kørnøv and Thissen 2000, Deelstra et al 2003, Hilden et al 2004, Nitz and Brown 2001), we 
believe there is still much that this field can contribute to EIA. This is particularly so when 
considering the discrete decision points in the planning and approvals process, which are the 
responsibility of an individual or at least a particular entity such as a panel or committee. 
Examples of such decision points include the final approval decision, where responsibility 
typically falls to an authority figure such as a Minister for Environment, and the point of approval 
of a preferred development option by a senior manager or Board of a proponent organisation 
prior to the commencement of the formal EIA process.  
 
It is in the context of these decision points that the substantive trade-offs (Morrison-Saunders 
and Pope 2013), with which we are chiefly concerned here, come into focus. It is true, however, 
that such authority figures are acting not on behalf of themselves but on behalf of the broader 
community and a range of stakeholders, including political masters in the case of a Minister, or 
on behalf of the organisation and its shareholders in the case of a proponent decision-maker. 
Moreover, individual decision makers also typically function within committee structures which 
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require joint decision-making. While we must therefore be cautious in transferring learnings from 
psychology directly to EIA, it can also be argued that any differences or tension between 
personal and organisational goals, as well as the complexities of political or organisational 
decision-making are simply part of the decision-making environment within which the individual 
or entity operates (Simon et al 1987), and therefore are relevant to the psychology research we 
draw upon here. 
 
The following sections set out to answer the three key questions introduced earlier through a 
literature review of the psychology research tradition.  We do not claim to offer conclusive 
solutions or specific recommendations but rather to introduce impact assessment researchers 
and practitioners to a body of knowledge from another field and invite them to explore further its 
potential implications for our work.   
 
 
2. When are trade-off decisions difficult?   
 
This section explores research on predicting how difficult a particular decision is to make.  The 
first section introduces so-called ‘predictors of decision difficulty’ and the second focuses in 
more depth on the role of values as a particularly important consideration in predicting difficulty. 
 
2.1 Predictors of decision difficulty 
 
Three types of decision difficulty are described by Frisch (2011), based on work by Beattie 
(1988) and Lopes (1990).  The first difficulty is to decide what to believe on the basis of 
conflicting evidence; the second is the challenge of making trade-offs between competing goals; 
while the third deals with decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. In each three of these 
areas, the research reveals that people’s judgment and decisions deviate from so-called models 
of rational behavior (e.g. Frisch, 2011). Moreover, research reported by Beattie and Barlas 
(2011) which builds on earlier research (e.g. Shepard, 1964; Foa and Foa, 1974; Schwartz, 
1986; Beattie 1988; Beattie et al, 1994) classifies a number of predictors of trade-off decision 
difficulty, namely:   
 
• Level of certainty:  In a decision-making context where there is a prevailing high level of 
uncertainty decision-making becomes more difficult. 
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• Concern over the outcome:  The less a decision-maker cares about the outcome the 
easier the trade-off decision.  
• Similarity between alternatives:  The more similar the options or alternatives, the easier 
the trade-off decision.  This could be expected because it is also typically true that the 
more similar the options or alternatives, the less important it becomes which one gets 
chosen. 
• Morality: If there is strong moral conviction related to a particular alternative then trade-
off decision-making becomes easier.  The moral basis for decisions is sometimes 
translated into so-called decision rules, which guide decision-making. 
• Commodities, currencies and non-commodities:  Decisions concerning trade-offs 
between non-commodities2 are more difficult and takes longer than those considering 
commodities3 and currencies4.  Policy makers in particular, shy away from making trade-
off decisions about non-commodities, and reflect a particular decision aversion in these 
cases (Beattie et al 1993). 
 
We briefly expand on each of these predictors with additional considerations in light of EIA 
practice. 
 
The first predictor relates to the level of certainty a decision-maker feels about making the right 
trade-off decision, which in turn relates to the types of decision conflict (i.e. dealing with 
conflicting evidence and uncertainty) described above but also to a large extent to the capacity 
and experience of the decision maker.  With respect to uncertainty it is interesting that 
Zeelenberg et al (2000, p535) report that: "people perceive unexpected negative outcomes as 
more aversive than expected negative outcomes", which is consistent with the view that 
reducing uncertainty in EIA is highly desirable so as to minimise the likelihood of unexpected 
negative outcomes. It could be argued that experienced and well capacitated decision makers 
experience less conflict when dealing with trade-offs because they are more confident in making 
the right decisions.  In contexts where EIA regulators are inexperienced and poorly capacitated 
(such as various developing countries) this likely leads to high levels of decision conflict and a 
particular difficulty in dealing with trade-offs.  Inexperience might also be associated with 
emotional difficulty which leads to decision aversion.  Moreover, the fear of subsequent regret of 
                                                          
2 Objects that either cannot be transferred (e.g. pain) or lose some of their value by being traded in 
markets (e.g. friendship). 
3 Objects that are appropriately bought and sold in markets. 
4 Objects that act as stand-ins for commodities (e.g. money). 
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making the wrong decision also explains why decision makers would delay decisions or request 
more information frustrating the assessment process. 
 
The level of concern over the outcome of the decision also determines trade-off decision 
difficulty.  In the case of regulated impact assessment this becomes a complex picture.  The 
level of concern over the outcome will differ between different role players (i.e. proponent, 
regulator, assessment practitioner, interested and affected parties).  It could be argued that 
proponents and interested and affected parties are most concerned about the outcome followed 
by regulators.  The concern over the outcome for assessment practitioners will vary depending 
whether they work for the proponent or the regulator.  Regulators are concerned mainly within 
the context of their mandate to make decisions and to ensure that they operate within their 
mandate.  As Simon et al (1987, p27) point out: “When people assume organizational positions 
they adapt their goals to their responsibilities”.  Assessment practitioners or consultants should 
generally provide an objective professional outcome and in some jurisdictions they are even by 
law required to operate independently from the proponent (e.g. South Africa) – with theoretically 
little concern for the outcome.  Therefore in relation to this particular predictor of decision 
difficulty proponents and their consultants together with interested and affected parties should 
experience most decision conflict followed by regulators and consultants. 
 
The level of similarity between options or alternatives as a predictor of decision difficulty has 
particular resonance with impact assessment because the consideration of alternatives lies at 
the heart of the process.  The decision-making sciences suggest that the more different the 
alternatives the more difficult the trade-off decision (e.g. Houston and Doan 1996; Fiske and 
Tetlock 1997). This means that one of the fundamental objectives of impact assessment and 
especially sustainability assessment, which is to consider as widely as possible new ways of 
thinking and doing, will inevitably inject high levels of decision difficulty.  However, in most EIA 
cases the alternatives to be compared are rather similar (e.g., different road alignments rather 
than, say, selecting between new road and railways, or introducing congestion charges for road 
traffic), given that the studies are conducted by the project proponent. This should limit the 
extent to which different types of impacts need to be traded-off.   
 
Considering morality as the fourth predictor of decision difficulty is perhaps more of a theoretical 
discussion, but nevertheless a very important one.  The research suggests that a strong moral 
basis for decision-making makes it easier to make a decision (Beattie, 1988), while Krosch et al 
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(2012, p224) state that: "morally challenging decisions tend to be perceived as difficult by 
decision makers". It seems to us that in impact assessment attempts have been made to 
translate morality into so-called ‘trade-off decision-making rules’ (see Gibson, 2006) or 
principles to guide decision-making.  Moral decisions are those decisions based on moral 
conviction devoid of personal interest or emotions.  Many of the difficulties in dealing with trade-
offs could be linked to this lack of moral agreement on what is the right thing to do for society as 
a whole not considering personal interests or preferences.  Difficulty with dealing with trade-offs 
in impact assessment can be viewed as a morality clash between the interests of different 
stakeholders such as the proponent, consultants and government.  
 
Decisions involving trade-offs between non-commodities are the most difficult, an observation 
that is particularly relevant in the context of environmental and sustainability decision-making 
where environmental values are usually non-commodified.  This is why predictive models and 
technologies for decision-making often translate non-commodities to currency and/or 
commodities (i.e. tradable goods).  Examples exist where environmental goods and services 
have been translated into currency and commodities for example the work done on the 
monetary value of ecosystem services (Costanza, et al 1997).  The latter is an attempt to 
translate non-commodities to currency in order to make it easier for decision makers to consider 
trade-offs, and this makes sense from a purely decision-making perspective.  However, 
Schwartz (1986) refers to the confusion this integration of market considerations with social and 
moral considerations causes as a kind of 'economic imperialism'.  He further argues that once a 
particular item has become viewed by society as an economic good (commodity) then it is no 
longer possible for people to treat it as a non-commodity.  Therefore, although the translation of 
non-commodities might be possible in some instances, impact assessments are fundamentally 
and continually expected to consider trade-offs between non-commodities.  Unfortunately the 
decision-making sciences do not have clear solutions on how to deal effectively with non-
commodity trade-offs.  As Beattie and Barlas (2011, p62) state, “We wish to question whether 
the same technologies used for commodities and currencies should also be extended to non-
commodities, or whether we should look for new technologies to aid people to make what is 
potentially difficult and painful decisions.”   
 




In the previous section, moral issues were identified as a contributing factor to trade-off 
decision-making difficulty. Closely related to this is the consideration of the role of values and 
emotions in trade-off decision-making (e.g. Baron and Spranca 1997), and 'taboo trade-offs', to 
use the term coined by Fiske and Tetlock (1997). Baron and Spranca (1997) discuss 'protected 
values', defining them as those that resist trade-offs with other values, and they note that people 
will express strong emotions, especially anger, at the thought of even making such trade-offs. 
They further suggest that protected values are a subset of moral values, and this explains why it 
would be 'taboo' to trade these off. It is little surprise to learn then that such trade-offs illicit a 
strong reaction by decision-makers such as outright denial (e.g. Baron and Spranca 1997) or 
blame deflection, procrastination, obfuscation and avoidance (e.g. Fiske and Tetlock 1997, 
Anderson 2003), a topic we return to in the following section.  
 
Fiske and Tetlock (1997) define four values systems within which decisions are made and social 
relations are carried out; these also approximately align with different political party ideologies (a 
similar link between personal values and political alliances is made by Lakoff 2004). The four 
values systems occur in a spectrum. To the definitions derived from Fiske and Tetlock (1997) 
that follow, we have added EIA related examples that we believe are relevant to each system: 
 
• Communal sharing value system – whereby everyone in the community gets an equal 
share of resources or involvement in processes. For example environmental resources 
such as clean air or national parks are to be shared by all. This is probably also where 
inter-generational considerations would fit, simply that there is an understanding that 
future generations should inherit high quality environmental resources (but no specifics 
beyond that general principle). 
• Authority ranking value system – whereby hierarchies apply such that some things or 
persons obtain more authority than others (this may include positive discrimination to 
give priority to minorities as per expectations for intra-generational equity). The need to 
account for differences in power in EIA activities such as public participation is well 
established and special resources (e.g. highly valued heritage or conservation sites or 
threatened species) may automatically trigger EIAs and require special attention if they 
are to be affected by development proposals. 
• Equality matching value system – which is based around a tit-for-tat exchange in which 
equivalent resources are exchanged in order to maintain an even score. This would 
appear to be an underlying principle for rehabilitation and environmental offsets (e.g. 
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like-for-like ecological compensation) with respect to ensuring maintenance of natural 
and social capital. 
• Market pricing value system – in which a unit of measurement (e.g. monetary values) is 
assigned so that meaningful ratios between alternatives can be determined; for example, 
the use of cost-benefit analysis in EIA and other forms of decision-making.  
 
Each of the four values systems are used by people all the time unquestioningly; social norms 
or shared values are all that are needed to make choices or trade-offs within any one system. 
There are no 'rules' to guide how decisions are made within each system, rather this is just 
assumed or understood wherever people have shared values (e.g. as is the case within political 
parties).  
 
Problems arise, however, when decision-makers or stakeholders involved in a particular 
decision subscribe to different values systems, and this is exacerbated as the span across the 
spectrum becomes greater. For example, the notion of putting a market price on clean air and 
thus converting it to a commodity will sound bizarre, impossible or outright offensive to many 
people, and a committee or panel charged with making a decision or recommendation in the 
context of EIA may include individuals spanning this divide. Similarly decision-makers may hold 
different value positions to the proponents or EIA professionals presenting the information and 
this may affect the decisions they make. We noted previously that commodities are easy to 
trade but non-commodities (i.e. social or environmental features) are difficult. As Fiske and 
Tetlock (1997, p273) state: "It is gauche, embarrassing, or offensive to make explicit trade-offs 
among the concurrently operative relational mode". With respect to the conceptual framework 
for trade-offs put forward by Morrison-Saunders and Pope (2013), trade-offs between economic, 
social and environmental categories will frequently, if not always, engender comparisons 
between value systems and thereby invite controversy. Baron and Spranca (1997) note that in 
such circumstances people become concerned about their participation in the process not just 
with the outcome. It is not surprising therefore that strong emotions are associated with values-
based or moral trade-offs. 
 
In short, to make a trade-off requires some common scale or basis for comparison for 
comparing the alternatives. Decision-making within a single value system is obvious and does 
not need to be explained because social norms prevail. Major problems loom however 
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whenever there is cross-over between two systems, with significant effects on decision-makers 
that we address in the next section. 
 
 
3. How do we react to difficult trade-off decisions? 
 
Decision attitudes are particularly important when considering decision behavior and particularly 
reaction to difficult trade-off decisions.  Decision behavior is generally considered against the 
extent to which people are decision seeking or decision averse.  Most people are decision 
seeking when making decisions for themselves, and decision averse when they are making 
decisions for others and this appears to be related to a desire for the self-determination of the 
affected parties (Beattie et al 1994). In EIA, the approval decision in most cases rests with one 
party (e.g. environment Minister) who must make decisions on behalf of all the other 
stakeholders, i.e. implying decision aversion will be the norm. However the process of arriving at 
the EIA approval decision point should of course include stakeholder engagement; and the way 
in which that process is conducted should influence the degree of difficulty experienced by the 
decision-maker (e.g. if consensus has already been reached with stakeholders then the 
decision presumably would be relatively easy).  Furthermore, research suggests that decision 
aversion is most apparent when the decision potentially violates principles of equality or equal 
treatment and/or when it could potentially cause a negative outcome for others.  These 
properties seem to be morally based, dealing with equity and self-determination. 
 
Research exploring the effect of emotion on decision-making shows that greater emotional 
difficulty leads to decision avoidance (Luce et al, 1999; Zeelenberg et al 1996).  Anderson 
(2003) identifies four decision avoidance effects on decision-makers: choice deferral, status quo 
bias, omission bias, and inaction inertia, and notes that the emotional nature of difficult 
decisions “predispose humans to do nothing” (p139). Hence decision avoidance "manifests itself 
as a tendency to avoid making a choice by postponing it or by seeking an easy way out that 
involves no action or no change" (Anderson 2003, p139). This implies that irrespective of 
whether a decision-maker is decision seeking or decision averse, difficult decisions will result in 
all decision-makers exhibiting avoidance traits. While decisions occur throughout the EIA 
process (e.g. Weston 2000, Morrison-Saunders and Pope 2013) it is the approval decision that 
is typically the most controversial and difficult because of the nature of trade-offs involved. 
These decisions are often the responsibility of elected officials and unless (or even when) EIA 
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legislation specifies timeframes for approval decision-making it is not uncommon for long delays 
to occur at this point in the process. 
 
As discussed previously, morally challenging decisions that involve values trade-offs are the 
most difficult for decision-makers and have the greatest impact on their behavior. Baron (1997, 
p72) notes that "many respondents want to 'protect' certain values from trade-offs, regarding 
them as absolutes" but suggests that in such situations decision-makers are unwilling to 
distinguish consequences from actions (or ends from means). In other words difficult decisions 
have the effect of leading decision-makers to resort to a fixed or absolute position without 
unpacking or understanding the nuances or how they arrived at that position. Baron and 
Spranca (1997) note that it is probably easier to make decisions if there are protected values to 
constrain decision-making, and that these are acquired from culture as kinds of 'moral rules' that 
should never be violated. Similarly Beattie et al (1994, p142) state that: "Societies will try to 
avoid certain (difficult) decisions by setting up fixed rules that require little interpretation". It is 
tempting to view the Gibson decision-making trade-off rules (Gibson et al 2005, Gibson 2006) 
as an attempt to set in place a standardized approach to making difficult trade-off decisions; 
however we suggest that they are so open to interpretation that they will not satisfy notions of 
fixed or moral rules.  
 
This is where formal decision aiding techniques frequently employed in EIA, such as multi-
criteria analysis (MCA), may play an important role. In MCA, the performances of the 
alternatives are first compared criterion by criterion (in EIA criteria typically reflect impacts on 
different environmental components), and then aggregated. The first comparison is performed 
by transforming the original criterion scores (e.g., noise level measured in dB) into a 
dimensionless range (typically between 0 and 1) that represents the desirability of that score, 
i.e., the degree to which it meets the evaluation objectives. This process – usually referred to as 
normalization – helps to make decision values explicit and allows comparison of alternatives on 
the basis of those values (Geneletti, 2005). For example, alternative A may produce less noise 
than alternative B, but if the noise levels are very low in both cases (e.g., below the background 
noise level) decision-makers may want to assign to both alternatives the same level of 
desirability. 
 
In the subsequent stages of MCA, stakeholders and decision makers assign weights to the 
criteria. A weight indicates the importance of one criterion relatively to the other criteria under 
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consideration. However, when the weighted summation is used as an aggregation method (and 
this is often the case in EIA applications), weights express levels of trade-offs between criteria, 
rather than absolute importance levels. As such, they are to be interpreted relatively to the 
actual range of the scores of the alternatives under evaluation: if this range changes, the 
weights are bound to change too. This is often not realized by decision-makers who tend to 
assign importance weights a priori, often to protect certain values. MCA techniques, and their 
implementing tools, help to clarify the actual meaning of the weights and to support the selection 
of weights specifically suited to the decision-making problem under evaluation. Thus the use of 
structured approaches such as MCA to guide comparison of alternatives may help to 'unblock' 
some of the decision avoidance tendencies noted by psychologists. 
 
Difficult trade-off decisions also cause emotional conflict which often leads to simplified decision 
strategies in which the decision is based on the single most important attribute rather than on a 
consideration of trade-offs among all relevant attributes.  Moreover, emotional conflicts lead 
people to favoring the status quo and avoid change (e.g. Anderson 2003).  Finally, emotional 
difficulty may to lead to extra weight being given to minimizing losses as opposed to enhancing 
equivalent gains (e.g. Beike and Sherman 1998; Anderson 2003).  Therefore in a time where 
there is increasing emphasis placed in EIA on the need to enhance gains rather than minimize 
impacts (e.g. Gibson 2006) decision makers would, when faced with difficult trade-off decisions, 
continue to be more concerned about trade-off losses than about trade-off gains.   
 
The potential for post-decision regret, worry or uncertainty, whether anticipated or experienced, 
also influences the choices people make and causes people to avoid decisions (e.g. Beattie et 
al 1994, Zeelengerg 1999, Krosch et al 2012) and can lead to excessive information gathering 
which simultaneously delays the making of a decisions whilst having the potential to reduce 
potential regret or uncertainty. This finding from the psychological literature can explain EIA 
situations in which regulators are relatively inexperienced and take a cautious rather than 
decisive approach by, for example, asking proponents to provide additional information or 
allowing scoping to become all-inclusive (e.g. Ross et al 2006; Kidd and Retief, 2009).  The 
research of Zeelenberg et al (1996, p157) found that in addition to changing pre-decision 
behaviour: "regret aversion results in choices that shield people from threatening feedback on 
forgone alternatives". The field of EIA follow-up is predicated on “learning from experience” 
(Marshall et al 2005, p177); it is interesting to reflect that difficult trade-off decisions in EIA (i.e. 
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the kinds of situations where learning might be particularly useful for future practice), are 
potentially also those that might be psychologically suppressed. 
 
Zeelenberg et al (2000) distinguish between the psychological phenomena of regret and 
disappointment experienced by decision-makers. While similar decision avoidance results in 
both cases, the authors note that avoiding risk is a simple way of avoiding disappointment and 
that one way of doing so is to opt for safe alternatives where the outcomes are known in 
advance with considerable certainty. This may explain why decision-makers tend to prefer the 
status quo and hence why EIA so often lends itself to 'business-as-usual' rather than the 
consideration of relatively radical alternatives. One positive effect of perceived disappointment 
reported by Zeelenberg et al (2000, p535) is that decision-makers may try harder to attain a 
desired outcome and invest more effort in the task on the basis that "Another way of avoiding 
disappointment is by trying to live up to one’s initial expectations".  
 
A related field of research specifically examines the influence of regret on decision-making and 
argues that trade-off decisions are difficult because decision-makers fear regret (Luce et al 
2011, Zeelenberg et al 1996, Zeelenberg et al 2011).  The possibility that another choice option 
may lead to a better outcome causes true decision conflict.  This fear of regret relates to either 
the regret of making a particular trade-off decision (and taking a risk) or regret of not making a 
decision (i.e. taking a risk), which results in delayed decision-making and a typical need for 
more data or information.  The eventual outcome of decisions also affects future similar 
decisions because the fear of regret leads people to being more cautious or more risky 
depending on their regret experience (Zeelenberg et al 2011).   
 
In this section we have established that trade-off decision behavior within EIA can be explained 
and to some extent predicted based on psychology research.  The next section explores ways 
of dealing with difficult trade-off decisions. 
 
 
4. How can we deal with difficult trade-off decisions? 
 
In previous sections we described factors that influence decision difficulty, also referred to as 
the predictors of decision difficulty. By pro-actively considering these difficulty factors/predictors, 
ways can be found to address or avoid difficulty.  For example, the first predictor suggests that 
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in a decision-making context where there is a prevailing high level of uncertainty decision-
making becomes more difficult.  Therefore difficulty in decision-making could be addressed by 
avoiding high levels of uncertainty. Within an EIA context this is particularly challenging because 
EIA almost always functions within high levels of uncertainty. Dealing with uncertainty has been 
a hot topic of debate in EIA through discussions on the application of the precautionary principle 
and the role of science (e.g. Cashmore, 2004), but it is not the purpose of this paper to repeat 
what has already been covered in the EIA literature. However, learning from the psychology 
literature suggests that the level of uncertainty also relates to the way a decision is framed 
which can have significant effects on responses (e.g Markman et al, 1993; Houston et al 1999, 
Kahneman and Tversky 1984, Beike and Sherman 1998, von Winterfeldt 2001). In the 
terminology of psychology, ‘framing’ refers to the way in which decisions or choices are 
presented to decision-makers (Tversky and Kahneman 1981); for example “as a problem or an 
opportunity, as a strategic choice or a tactical move, as an approach to balance multiple 
objectives, or as a means to meet a specific goal” (von Winterfeldt 2001, p261).  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) found that a decision frame is well presented if the stakeholders agree that 
the decision alternatives are defined at the right level of abstraction (e.g. strategic vs tactical), 
that the alternatives include the ones they prefer, and that the objectives cover all of their 
concerns.  
 
Gregory et al (2012, p212), who similarly draw upon the psychological literature, suggest that 
good practice with respect to making trade-off decisions should include the use of multiple 
framings and multiple elicitation methods to “draw on both cognitive and intuitive systems of 
thinking and to draw on both individual and group thinking”. Their approach is very similar to 
SEA and sustainability assessment approaches as promoted in the impact assessment 
literature (e.g. Therivel 2004); i.e. involving setting objectives, engaging stakeholders throughout 
and selection and enhancement of the chosen alternative following in-depth MCA or similar 
processes. 
 
Another framing consideration is the way criteria or indicators are used to compare the 
alternatives, and in particular how they are presented and arranged in a hierarchy. This 
concerns not only criteria ordering, but also the complexity of the hierarchy (how many levels), 
as well as the level of ’balance’ among the different levels, since people are biased to 
overweight parts of a criteria hierarchy that are developed in detail relative to those that are not 
(Weber et al 1988). Furthermore, decision-making normally takes place under human 
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information-processing constraints.  These constraints should be accounted for in the decision 
framing. Psychologists have proved that human intellectual ability is limited in certain respects, 
and in particular have difficulty in dealing with more than seven, plus or minus two, factors at a 
time. This ’magical number’ was proposed by Miller in his seminal work (1956), and confirmed 
by several psychological experiments. So, if somebody has to compare the relative importance 
of 15 impact types at the same time they will give inconsistent answers because the range 
exceeds their cognitive capacity. 
 
The second difficulty predictor relates to the concern over the outcome and on the basis that the 
less a decision-maker cares about the outcome the easier the trade-off decision.  Therefore one 
way of dealing with difficulty is to place as much distance between the decision maker and the 
implications of the decision as possible. An example in some EIA systems is the requirement for 
EIA consultants to declare their independence and lack of vested interest in the proposed 
developments.  Also from a regulator perspective this is achieved by setting up committees to 
make recommendations to the final decision maker. In terms of institutional arrangements 
experience in some jurisdictions shows that local authorities do not make good regulators 
because the implications of the development in terms of short term local economic gain 
potentially cloud their judgment. Assigning mandates to higher spheres of government such as 
provincial, regional or national seems to remedy this situation to some extent.   
 
The similarity between alternatives is the third difficulty predictor and suggests that the more 
similar the options or alternatives, the easier the trade-off decision.  Again, within the EIA 
context this is problematic since a wide range of alternatives should ideally be considered. 
However, learning from psychology shows that it also matters if a decision maker is required to 
choose an alternative or to reject an alternative, because people tend to focus on positive 
features when asked to choose and negative features when asked to reject.  When comparing 
two alternatives, a focus on the good features of an alternative and choosing it for its merits is 
relatively easy and psychologically pleasant for decision-makers;  Houston and Doan (1996) 
refer to such decisions as 'approach-approach choices'. In contrast they also describe 
'avoidance-avoidance choices' which are characterized by eliminating one alternative on the 
basis of its detriments and choosing the remaining alternative by default as being relatively 




A further consideration is the order in which alternatives are compared, which is discussed by 
Beike and Sherman (1998) at some length. Put in simple terms, comparing A to B is not the 
same as comparing B to A. The first alternative considered becomes the subject and the latter 
the referent. In decision-making a person considers what they know about the subject and 
matches this information to what they know about the referent; thus shared and unique features 
become distinguished. The key point is that switching the order changes the relationship 
between two alternatives. In light of a fundamental principle of EIA being the comparison of 
alternatives, it would be valuable for practitioners to know and understand more about how the 
simple ordering and presentation of alternatives affects decision-makers, particularly in the 
context of an internal decision-maker approving a preferred development alternative. 
 
A particular point emphasized throughout Beike and Sherman (1998) is that it is important within 
the EIA context that the decision-maker (either an individual or committee charged with making 
a decision or recommendation about the proposal) understands how the decision has been 
framed by the proponent or EIA professional and is aware of how this might subconsciously 
influence the decision-making process. This point has not been made within the impact 
assessment literature previously (to our knowledge); for example, when Gibson (2006, p175) 
advocated that when making trade-off decisions that “the most desirable (or least bad) option be 
chosen” he does not appear to consider the influence of framing on the decision-maker. In 
contrast, Houston and Doan (1996) report that framing as the 'least bad' alternative creates 
greater levels of choice conflict, resulting in longer decision times, as well as lower post-choice 
feelings of satisfaction with the choice made, and lower post-choice evaluations of both the 
chosen and rejected alternatives. In short, choosing something (i.e. a focus on the positive) is 
different from rejecting something. 
 
The fourth difficulty predictor relates to dealing with morality and values on the basis that if there 
is a strong moral conviction related to a particular alternative then trade-off decision-making 
becomes easier. With respect to how policy-makers should approach trade-off decisions 
involving conflicting values and morals (as a predictor of decision difficulty), Beike and Sherman 
(1998) note that the two dominant recommended approaches in the literature are 'mechanisms 
of electoral accountability' (i.e. transparency and public accountability) or via 'technocratic 
mechanisms' such as cost-benefit analysis or MCA. However, they go on to state that "Both fail, 
however, to come to grips with the qualitative complexity of social life and the irreducible 
pluralism of our moral intuitions" (p257). This is because merely making explicit the possibility of 
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these types of trade-offs "weakens, corrupts, and degrades one's moral standing" (p256) and 
that "From the standpoint of political expediency or even social peace, honest, integratively 
complex reasoning that renders the trade-offs transparent is likely to be the least effective 
strategy" (p257). We quote the findings of Beike and Sherman (1998) at some length here 
because they are fundamentally counter to the prevalent advice proffered in the EIA literature. 
The Gibson (2006) decision-making trade-off rules, for example, are founded on transparency 
and disclosure of trade-offs in EIA decision-making, but as the psychology literature makes 
abundantly clear, taboo trade-offs are akin to political suicide. 
 
Finally, the fifth difficulty predictor argues that decisions concerning trade-offs between non-
commodities are more difficult and take longer than those considering commodities and 
currencies. The learning from psychology serves rather as a caution about the pitfalls and 
difficulties in dealing with non-commodity trade-offs than providing explicit solutions on how to 
deal with this challenge.  As stated by Beattie and Barlas (2011, p62): 
Given the limited information processing capacity of humans and the many judgmental errors that 
we habitually make, decision aids should be extremely useful in a wide variety of problem 
applications.  We wish merely to question whether the same technologies used for commodities 
and currencies should be extended to non-commodities, or whether we should look at new 
technologies to aid people in making what are potentially difficult and painful decisions.   
Therefore the psychology literature suggests that there are no ‘off the shelf’ solutions or 
technologies to deal with the complexities of non-commodities, but that recognition of the role of 
different value systems in decision-making (as described previously) seems central towards 
finding solutions.   
 
 
7. Reflections and conclusions – Key learning points for EIA 
 
Our aim in this paper was to distill key learning points from the preceding discussion for dealing 
with trade-offs in EIA.  Although we do not claim to have provided definitive answers to all the 
questions raised, we have shown that that the field of psychology offers rich insights and key 
learnings for dealing with trade-offs in EIA.  Figure 2 expands on Figure 1 and provides a 




The first key learning point is that the three questions posed in the introduction (Figure 1) are 
interrelated and insights related to the one invariably inform the other.  For example in dealing 
with the question, how can we deal with difficult trade-off decisions? - it helps to understand 
when decisions will be difficult and what behavior is expected.  Solutions could typically relate to 
addressing factors that enhance difficulty or predicting and anticipating certain behavior.  
Similarly, how EIA decision-makers react to difficult trade-off decisions could be pro-actively 
informed by predicting decision difficulty in the first place.  
 
The second key learning point is related to difficulty prediction.  It is clear from the so-called 
predictors of decision difficulty such as level of certainty, concern over the outcome, similarity 
between alternatives, morality and values as well as dealing with non-commodities, that they 
are all to some extent recognizable in day to day EIA practice.  This suggests that by its very 
nature EIA practitioners should expect a high level of decision difficulty when dealing with trade-
offs.  Moreover, with increasing focus in impact assessment turning towards consideration of 
sustainability, the level of trade-off decision difficulty could be expected to increase even further.  
Through considering the psychology literature covered in this paper we have confirmed that EIA 





Figure 2:  Key learning points for dealing with trade-offs in EIA 
 
Similar to the decision difficulty predictors, the behavioral reactions to difficult trade-off decisions 
observed by psychologists mirror what is experienced in EIA practice.  Reactions such as 
choice deferral, status quo bias and at times excessive information requests, are typical within 
EIA systems internationally.  The third key learning point is that these reactions have been 
shown to be typical or expected (or even normal) within psychology.  The EIA community has 
spend a lot of time trying to iron out or deal with these reactions through policy measures and 
legislative reforms such as placing timeframes on decision-making or prescribing information 
requirements for EIA.  If, however, EIA practitioners were to acknowledge that these symptoms 
have a psychological origin they might start to think differently about how to deal with them.   
 
This leads us to our fourth and final key learning point which is that finding solutions for dealing 
more effectively with difficult trade-off decisions will rely on the ability to predict decision 
difficulty and anticipate behavior, as well as how we present features and frame decisions.  
Fundamentally, we also argue throughout that understanding and finding solutions to dealing 
with difficult trade-off decisions requires recognition and understanding of the role of values and 
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morality.  It is therefore appropriate to quote Caldwell (1989, p12) who stated that “EIA will be 
most effective where environmental values (1) are implicitly and consensual in the national 
culture and (2) are explicit in public law and policy”.  This paper supports the view of Caldwell 
(1989) and acknowledges that many of our difficulties in dealing with trade-offs are linked to the 
lack of consensual values when dealing with trade-offs. 
 
It is our hope that after reading this paper, EIA consultants, government regulators and other 
interested parties will better understand why they may be struggling to deal with a particular 
trade-off decision and/or why they observe certain decision-making behavior in others.  Also, we 
hope to have provided some useful insights as to how to deal with difficult trade-offs in practice.  
The further challenge now is for the EIA fraternity to adapt and apply the lessons learnt from 
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